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What is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment? In the presence of financing frictions,
firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects. Through this collateral channel, shocks
to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggregate investment. Over the 1993-2007 period,
the representative U.S. corporation invests 6 cents out of each additional dollar of collateral. To compute
this sensitivity, we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms
that own real estate. We address the endogeneity of local real estate prices using the interaction of
interest rates and local constraints on land supply as an instrument. We address the endogeneity of
the decision to own land (1) by controlling for observable determinants of ownership and (2) by looking
at the investment behavior of firms before and after they acquire land. The sensitivity of investment
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In the presence of contract incompleteness, Barro (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Hart
and Moore (1994) point out that collateral pledging enhances a rm's debt capacity. Providing
outside investors with the option to liquidate pledged assets ex post acts as a strong disciplining
device on borrowers. This, in turn, eases nancing ex ante. Asset liquidation values thus play a
key role in the determination of a rm's debt capacity. This simple observation has important
macroeconomic consequences: as noted by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), business downturns
will deteriorate assets values, thus reducing debt capacity and depressing investment, which
will amplify the downturn. This \collateral channel" is often the main suspect for the severity
of the Great Depression (Bernanke (1983)) or for the extraordinary expansion of the Japanese
economy at the end of the 80s (Cutts (1990)). In the current context of abruptly declining real
estate prices in the U.S., an assessment of the relevance of this \collateral channel" is called for.
This paper attempts to empirically uncover the microeconomic foundation for this mechanism.
We show that over the 1993-2007 period, a one dollar increase in collateral value leads the
representative U.S. public corporation to raise its investment by 6 cents. This sensitivity can
be quantitatively important in the aggregate. This is because real estate represents a sizable
fraction of the tangible assets that rms hold on their balance sheet. As we show in this paper,
in 1993, among public rms in the US, 58% reported at least some real estate ownership. Among
these land-holding rms, the market value of real estate accounted for 19% of the rm's total
market value. To get at this 6 cents sensitivity, we use variations in local real estate prices,
either at the state or the city level, as shocks to the collateral value of land holding rms. We
measure how a rm's investment responds to each additional dollar of real estate that the rm
actually owns, and not how investment responds to real estate shocks overall. This empirical
strategy uses two sources of identication. The rst comes from the comparison, within a local
area, of the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices accross rms with and without real
estate. The second comes from the comparison of investment by land holding rms across areas
with dierent variations in real estate prices. The methodology is similar to Case et al. (2001)
in their study of home wealth eects on household consumption.
Two sources of endogeneity might aect our estimation: (1) real estate prices may be cor-
related with the investment opportunities of land holding rms and (2) the decision to own or
lease real estate may be correlated with the rm's investment opportunities. As in Himmelberg
et al. (2005) or Mian and Su (2009), we address the rst source of endogeneity by instrument-
ing local real estate prices using the interaction of long-term interest rate with local housing
supply elasticity. We do not have a proper set of instruments to deal with the second source of
endogeneity. We make two attempts at gauging the severity of the bias it may cause. We rst
control for the observable determinants in the ownership decision, which leaves the estimation
unchanged. Second, we estimate the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices for rms that
acquire real estate before and after they do so. Before acquiring real estate, future purchasers
are statistically indistinguishable from rms that never own real estate. The sensitivity of their
investment to real estate prices becomes large, positive and signicant only after they acquire
real estate.
Our paper is related to existing work on collateral and investment. Jie Gan (2006) in an
important contribution, showed, using a dierence-in-dierence like approach, that land holding
2Japanese rms were more aected by the bust of the real estate bubble in the beginning of
the 90s than rms with no real estate. We view our contribution as complementary. First,
one might worry that, because the Japanese economy is bank-oriented, the role of collateral
might be much larger than in a more market-based economy like the U.S. Second, her paper
exploits extreme market conditions, and in particular a period where banks in Japan were
distressed. This might aect the degree of nancing frictions that rms face, and hence lead
to an upward-bias of the eect. While we provide specic evidence on the recent real estate
bubble, we also use a large U.S. sample over a long period, covering mostly \normal" market
conditions. Third, the identication assumption in Gan (2006) is that land holding rms were
not dierentially aected by the bust of the bubble when compared to non-land holding rms.
This is a strong assumption considering that land-holding rms are larger rms that might have
been more exposed, for instance, to exchange rates swings contemporaneous to the bubble. Our
identifying assumption requires only that land holding and non land holding rms have the same
reaction to variations in local real estate prices, a much weaker assumption.1 Another important
contribution is Peek and Rosengreen (1997), who look at the supply side of credit. Based also
on the Japanese real estate bubble, they show that banks owning depreciated real estate assets
cut their credit supply, leading to a decrease in their clients' investment.2
Secondly, our paper is also closely related to recent works that try to highlight the role of
collateral in nancial contracts. Benmelech, et al. (2005) document that more liquid (or more
\redeployable") pledgeable assets are nanced with loans of longer maturities and durations.
Benmelech and Bergman (2008) documents how U.S. airline companies are able to take advan-
tage of lower collateral value to renegotiate ex post their lease obligation downward. Finally,
Benmelech and Bergman (forthcoming) construct industry-specic measures of redeployability
and show that more redeployable collateral leads to lower credit spreads, higher credit rat-
ings, and higher loan-to-value ratios. While we do not go into such details in the examination
of nancial contracts, our paper contributes to this literature by empirically emphasizing the
importance of collateral for nancing and investment decisions.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the construction of
the data and summary statistics. Section 3 describes our main empirical results on investment
and capital structure decisions. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
We use accounting data on US listed rms, merged with real estate prices at the state and
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.
1Another contribution looking at collateral shocks triggered by the Japanese crisis can be found in Goyal and
Yamada (2001).
2Gan (2007) also uses the Japanese crisis as a shock to banks health and identies the importance of bank
health on their clients' investment.
3For other contributions emphasizing the role of collateral in boosting pledgeable income, see, among others,
Eisfeldt and Rampini (forthcoming) and Rampini and Viswanathan (2008)
32.1 Accounting Data
We start from the sample of active COMPUSTAT rms in 1993 with non-missing total assets
(COMPUSTAT item #6). This provides us with a sample of 9,211 rms and a total of 83,719
rm-year observations over the period 1993 - 2007. We keep rms whose headquarters are located
in the United States and exclude from the sample rms operating in the nance, insurance,
real estate, construction and mining industries, as well as rms involved in a major takeover
operation. We keep rms that appear at least three consecutive years in the sample. This
leaves us with a sample of 5,121 rms and 51,467 rm year observations. We defer the reader to
Appendix A for details on the construction of accounting ratios used in the regression analysis.
2.1.1 Real Estate Assets
We collect data on the value of real estate assets of each rm. After measuring the initial market
value of real estate assets of each rm, we will identify variations in their value coming from
variations in real estate prices across space and over time.
First, we measure the market value of real estate assets. Following Nelson et al. (1999),
three major categories of property, plant and equipments are included in the denition of real
estate assets: Buildings, Land and Improvement and Construction in Progress. Unfortunately,
these assets are not marked-to-market, but valued at historical cost. To recover their market
value, we calculate the average age of those assets, and use historical prices to compute their
current market value. The procedure is as follows. The ratio of the accumulated depreciation
of buildings (COMPUSTAT item #253) to the historic cost of buildings (COMPUSTAT item
#263)4 measures the proportion of the original value of a building claimed as depreciation.
Based on a depreciable life of 40 years,5 we compute the average age of buildings for each rm.
Using state-level residential real estate ination after 1975, and CPI ination before 1975, we
compute the market value of real estate assets for each year in the sample period (1993-2007).
The accumulated depreciation on buildings is no longer available in COMPUSTAT after
1993.6 This is why we restrict our sample to rms active in 1993. There are 2,750 rms in 1993
in our sample for which we are able to construct a measure of the market value of real estate
assets and 28,014 corresponding rm-year observations. Table 1 reveals two striking facts. In
1993, 58% of all US public rms reported some real estate ownership. Moreover, for the median
rm in the entire sample, the market value of real estate represents 30% of the book value of
Property, Plants and Equipment (and 5% of the rm's total market value). For the median land
holding rm in COMPUSTAT, the market value of real estate represents 98% of the book value
of Property, Plant and Equipment and 19% of the rm's total market value. Real estate is thus
a sizable fraction of the tangible assets that corporations hold on their balance sheet.
4Unlike buildings, land and improvements, are not depreciated.
5As in Nelson et al. (1999), this assumption can be tested by estimating annual depreciation amounts (as
the change in total depreciation). Building cost, when divided by annual depreciation, provides an estimate of
depreciable life. Although inconsistent, the average life estimated by this approach ranges from 38 to 45 years.
This conrms our assumption of a 40-year-life.
6In 1994, ten of the fteen schedules required for Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system
(EDGAR) lings were eliminated. In particular, the accumulated depreciation on Buildings is no longer reported.
4Second, to measure accurately how the value of real estate assets evolves, we need to know
the location of these assets. COMPUSTAT does not provide us with the geographic location
of each specic piece of real estate owned by a rm. However, the data reports headquarter
location (variables STATE and COUNTY). We use the headquarter location as a proxy for the
location of real estate. There are two assumptions underlying this choice. First, headquarters
and production facilities tend to be clustered in the same state and MSA. Second, headquarters
represent an important fraction of corporation real estate assets. We discuss the relevance of
this choice in section 2.3.
2.1.2 Ex-Ante Measure of Credit Constraint
The standard empirical approach in the investment literature uses ex ante measures of nancial
constraint to sort between \Constrained" and \Unconstrained" rms. Estimations are performed
separately for each set of rms. We follow Almeida et al. (2004) in this approach and dene
three measures of credit constraint using the following schemes:
 Payout ratio: In every year over the 1993 - 2007 period, we rank rms based on their payout
ratio and assign to the nancially constrained (unconstrained) group those rms in the
bottom (top) three deciles of the annual payout distribution. We compute the payout ratio
as the ratio of total distributions (dividends plus stock repurchases) to operating income.
 Firm Size: In every year over the 1993 - 2007 period, we rank rms based on their total
assets and assign to the nancially constrained (unconstrained) group those rms in the
bottom (top) three deciles of the annual asset size distribution.
 Bond Rating: In every year over the 1993 - 2007 period, we retrieve from COMPUS-
TAT data on bond ratings assigned by Standard & Poor's and categorize those rms
with debt outstanding but without a bond rating as nancially constrained. Financially
unconstrained rms are those whose bonds are rated.
2.2 Real Estate Data
2.2.1 Real Estate Prices
We use data on residential and commercial real estate prices, both at the state and at the MSA
level.
Residential real estate prices come from the Oce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.78
The O.F.H.E.O. provides a Home Price Index (HPI), which is a broad measure of the movement
of single-family home prices in the US.9 Because of the breadth of the sample, it provides more
7http://www.ofheo.gov/index.asp
8The O.F.H.E.O. is an independent entity within the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
whose primary mission is \ensuring the capital adequacy and nancial safety and soundness of two government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) - the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)".
9The HPI is computed using a hedonic regression and each release of the HPI oers a dierent value of the
index for a given state year. The results presented in the paper are not, however, signicantly dierent if, for
instance, we use the 2006 release instead of the 2007 release.
5information than is available in other house price indices. In particular, the HPI is available at
the state level since 1975. It is also available for most Metropolitan Statistical Areas, with a
starting date between 1977 and 1987 depending on the MSA considered. We match the state
level HPI with our accounting data using the state identier from COMPUSTAT. To match
the MSA level HPI, we aggregate FIPS codes from COMPUSTAT into MSA identiers using a
correspondence table available from the OFHEO website.
Commercial real estate prices come from Global Real Analytics. This dataset provides a
price index for Oces and Industrial Commercial Real Estate.10 This index is only available for
a subset of 64 MSAs in the U.S. with a starting date between 1985 and 2003.
Table 1 provides details on these indices (that have been normalized to 1 in 2006). The
correlation between the residential and commercial indices at the state level is .57, and .42 at
the MSA level. The correlation between the MSA-level and state-level residential indices is .86.
2.2.2 Measuring Land Supply
Controlling for the potential endogeneity of local real estate prices in an investment regression is
an important step in our analysis. Following Himmelberg et al. (2005), we instrument local real
estate prices using the interaction of long-term interest rates and local housing supply elasticity.
Local housing supply elasticities are provided by Saiz (2009) and are available for 95 MSAs.
These elasticities capture the amount of developable land in each metro area and are estimated
by processing satellite-generated data on elevation and presence of water bodies. As a measure
of long-term interest rates, we use the \contract rate on 30 year, xed rate conventional home
mortgage commitments" from the Federal Reserve website, between 1993 and 2007.
2.3 Measurement Issues
The empirical methodology we use in this paper relies on several approximations that introduce
measurement errors in the regression analysis. In this Section, we present evidence in support
of these approximations.
The rst approximation we make relates to the location of rms' real estate assets. We
assume that rms own most of their real estate assets in the state (or MSA) where their head-
quarters are located. We do so because there is no systematic source of information on corpo-
rations \true" location(s). To check the validity of this approximation, we hand collected the
10K forms led with the Security and Exchange Commission for a randomly selected sample
of 375 corporations with non-missing real estate data in COMPUSTAT. These documents were
retrieved from the SEC's EDGAR website. Among these 375 rms, 179 rms report real estate
ownership both in COMPUSTAT and in their 10K le. 80% of these 179 rms (i.e. 139 rms)
report in their 10K le a major property in the state where their headquarter is located. This
gives credence to our assumption that most rms reporting real estate assets in COMPUSTAT
have a sizable fraction of these assets located in their headquarter's state.
Looking directly into the 10K les also allows us to address a second concern, which relates
to the quality of the real estate information in COMPUSTAT. Among the 132 rms with no
10We use the Oces index in our analysis but the main results are left unchanged if we use the Industrial
index instead.
6ownership reported on COMPUSTAT, 24 (i.e. 18%) declare at least some property in their 10K
le. Symmetrically, among the 243 rms that report real estate assets on their balance sheet,
64 (i.e. 23%) declare no property on their 10K les.
Finally, using the OFHEO residential real estate prices as a proxy for commercial real estate
prices could be a source of noise in our regression. As noted earlier, the correlation between
the two indices ranges from .42 (at the MSA level) to .57 (at the State Level). Moreover, the
commercial index is available only at the MSA level, and for a subset of cities. Therefore, there
is a trade-o: this index corresponds more accurately to the true nature of rms real estate
assets but it relies on the stronger assumption that these assets are mostly located in the city
where headquarters are located. We present evidence using both types of prices (residential and
commercial) and show that our results do not depend on the price index used.
3 Real Estate Prices and Firm Behavior
In this Section we analyze the impact of real estate shocks on corporate investment. Our goal is
to provide an estimate of the nancial multiplier (i.e. by how much an increase in assets' value
increases investment) at the rm-level.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
We run dierent specications of a standard investment equation for rm i, at date t, with
headquarters located in state or MSA s. We start with the following specication:
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+ controlsit + it; (1)
where INV is the ratio of investment to lagged PPE, RE V aluei is the ratio of the market value




93 measures the growth in real estate prices in
state s from 1993 to year t. As is typically done in the reduced-form investment literature, we
control for the ratio of cash ows to PPE, the one year lagged market to book value of assets
and the lagged leverage. We also include a rm xed eect i, as well as year xed eects t,





93 controls for the overall impact of the real estate cycle on investment,
irrespective of whether a rm owns real estate or not. Shocks "it are clustered at the state  year
level. This correlation structure is conservative given that the explanatory variable of interest




93 is dened at the rm level (see Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan [2004]).
As noted in Section 2.1.1, the market value of the real estate holdings of a rm can only be
estimated before 1993, which is the last year for which accumulated depreciations on Buildings
are available. RE V aluei is thus dened as the initial market value of a rm's real estate assets,




93 capture uctuations in the market values of these particular assets. In
particular, RE V aluei is not time-varying, and its level is not identied separately from the rm
xed eect i.
Let us also highlight that the coecient  measures how a rm's investment responds to
each additional $1 of real estate the rm actually owns, and not how investment responds to
7real estate shocks overall. This specication allows us to abstract from state-specic shocks that
would aect both rms with and without real estate assets.
Endogeneity Issues
There are two potential sources of endogeneity in the estimation of equation 1: (1) real estate
prices could be correlated with investment opportunities and (2) the ownership decision could
be related with investment opportunities.
There are two immediate reasons why real estate prices could be correlated with investment
opportunities. The rst one is a simple reverse causality argument: large rms might have a non
negligible impact through labor demand on the local activity, so that an increase in investment
for such large, land holding rms, could trigger a real estate price appreciation. This would lead
us to over-estimate . Second, it could be that our measure of real estate prices proxies for local
demand shocks, and that land holding rms are more sensitive to local demand.
To address this source of endogeneity, we instrument MSA level real estate prices. As already
mentioned in Section 2.2.2, and following Himmelber et al. (2005) and Mian and Su (2009), we
do so by interacting local housing elasticities with aggregate shifts in the interest rate. When
interest rates decrease, the demand for real estate increases. If the local supply of land is
very elastic, the increased demand will translate mostly into more construction (more quantity)
rather than higher land prices. If the supply of land is very inelastic on the other hand, the
increased demand will translate mostly into higher prices rather than more construction. We
expect that in MSA's where land supply is more constrained, a drop in interest rate should have
a larger impact on real estate prices. As our rst stage regression, we thus estimate, for MSA







m + t + :Elasticity
m  IRt + u
m
t ; (2)
where Elasticitym measures constraints on land supply at the MSA leve, IRt is the nationwide
real interest rate at which banks renance their home loans. m is an MSA xed eect, and t
captures macroeconomic uctuations in real estate prices, from which we want to abstract.
The second source of endogeneity in the estimation of equation 1 comes from the ownership
decision: if rms that are more likely to own real estate are also more sensitive to local demand
shocks, we would over-estimate . As a rst step in addressing this issue, we control for initial




93. The Xi are controls that
we believe might play an important role in the ownership decision and include 5 quintiles of
Age, Assets, Return on Assets and Leverage as well as 2-digit industry dummies and State
dummies. We show in Table 2 that these characteristics are good predictors of the decision to
buy real estate assets and, to a lesser extent, on the amount of real estate purchased. Table 2
is a simple cross-sectional OLS regression of RE OWNER, a dummy equal to 1 when the rm
owns real estate, and RE value, the market value of the rm's real estate assets, on the initial
characteristics mentioned above. Older, larger and more protable rms, i.e. mature rms, are
more likely to be owners in our dataset. 11
11Note that, from an intuitive perspective, these rms seem to be more likely to be insulated from local demand
8Controlling for the observed determinants of real estate ownership, we end up estimating the
following reduced form investment equation:
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t + controlsit + it (3)
However, some determinants of the land holding decisions might not be observable, which
makes our approach in equation (3) insucient. Unfortunately, it is dicult to nd rm-level
instruments that predict real estate ownership. Yet, we can still attempt to empirically measure
how dierent land holding rms are compared to non-land holding rms. To do so, we look
in Section 3.5 at the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices for rms that are about to
purchase a property, but before the purchase. If the unobserved characteristics that co-determine
investment and ownership is time invariant, then it should be the case that rms that are about
to purchase real estate assets are already more sensitive to the real estate cycle. Section 3.5
detail the implementation of this test in greater details. We insist however that while suggestive,
this approach is by no mean denitive, as the unobserved heterogeneity could well vary with
time.
3.2 Main Results
Table 3 reports estimates of various specications of equation (1) and (3). Column (1) starts
with the simplest estimation of equation (1) without any additional controls. Land holding rms
increase their investment more than non land holding rms when real estate prices increase. The
baseline coecient is .08, so that each additional $1 of real estate collateral increases investment
by 8 cents. The coecient is signicant at the 1% condence level. The eect is economically
large: a one s.d. increase in RE V alue explains 28% of investment's s.d.
In Column (2), we add the initial controls interacted with real estate prices that account for
the observed heterogeneity in ownership decisions and its potential impact on the sensitivity of
investment to real estate prices. The coecient is now .07, still signicant at the 1% condence
level, somewhat smaller but not statistically dierent from .08 found in column (1).
Column (3) adds state variables traditionally used in investment equations, i.e. Cash and
Market to Book. The reduced form sensitivity remains positive but is now smaller, equal to
.055.1213 In other words, a one s.d. increase in collateral value explains a 20% s.d. increase
in investment once the eect of the Market to Book and the other controls are accounted
for. Note that, as is traditional in the investment literature, both Cash and Market to Book
shocks. This suggests that the hypothesis according to which land holding rms are inherently more likely to be
aected by local demand shocks is not the most likely a priori.
12In particular, in unreported regressions, we see that most of the drop in the sensitivity comes from adding
the control for the Market-to-Book ratio and not from adding Cash.
13As we explain in our working paper (Chaney et al. (2009)), the drop in  once the Market-to-Book ratio is
controlled for can easily be interpreted in the light of a simple model of investment with collateral constraints.
Intuitively, to leave the Market-to-Book ratio unchanged after a positive shock to the value of the rm's real
estate assets, there need to be a negative shock to unobserved productivity. This negative shock to productivity
generates a negative shock to investment. As a consequence, the response of investment to the initial shock in
real estate prices will be smaller than it would have been had the Market-to-Book ratio not been controlled for.
9have a signicant, positive impact on investment. However, we also notice that the additional
explanatory power brought about by these controls remains limited, increasing the R2 of the
regression from .35 up to .4.
Column (4) tests whether the relation between collateral value and investment found in
column (3) depends on the shape of the empirical distribution of collateral values. To do so, we
interact the RE OWNER dummy (equal to 1 when a rm initially owns some real estate assets)
with the real estate price index. The estimated coecient is positive and strongly signicant,
indicating that our results are not driven by rms with large real estate holdings. Somewhat
mechanically, the binary model has a lower predictive power on investment: A one s.d. increase
in real estate prices explains a 9% s.d. increase in investment for land holding rms.
Column (5) replicates the estimation performed in Column (3) using MSA-level residential
price index instead of the State-level index. Using MSA level prices has both advantages and
drawbacks. It oers a more precise source of variation in real estate prices. It also makes our
identifying assumption that investment opportunities are uncorrelated with variations in local
prices much milder. However, there are potentially larger measurement errors, as we now rely on
the assumption that all the real estate assets that a rm owns are located in the headquarters'
city. The results in Column (4) show that the coecient remains stable, at .055.
Column (6) uses commercial real estate prices instead of residential prices. The lower number
of MSAs with available commercial real estate prices reduces slightly the number of observations
(18,062 observations compared to 22,771 in the specication using MSA residential prices).
However, the sensitivity is equal to 0.063 and signicant at the 1% level, and is slightly higher
than that computed using residential prices: a $1 increase in the value of commercial real estate
assets leads to an average increase of 6.3 cents in investment.
Column (7) implements the IV strategy where real estate prices are instrumented using the
interaction of interest rates and local constraint on land supply (see Section 3.1). Let us rst
briey comment the rst stage regressions, which are direct estimations of equation 2. These
estimations are presented in Table 4. The rst two columns predict MSA residential prices,
while the two last columns predict MSA oce prices. In column (1) and (3), we directly use
the measure of local housing supply elasticity provided in Saiz (2009). In column (2) and (4),
we group MSAs by quartile of local housing supply elasticity.
Low values of local housing supply elasticity corresponds to MSAs with very constrained
land supply. We expect the eect of declining interest rates on prices to be stronger in MSAs
with less elastic supply. As expected, the  coecient in equation 2 is positive and signicant at
the 1% condence level. For instance, using the results in Column (4), a 100 basis points interest
rate decline increases the oce price index by 6 percentage points more in \constrained" cities
(75th percentile of the elasticity distribution) than in \unconstrained" cities (25th percentile).
These eects are economically large, and signicant. All F-tests for nullity of the instrument
are above 10 which leads us to conclude that these instruments are not weak. Moving to the
second stage equation, we simply use predicted prices c P m
t from the estimation of equation 2 and
use them as an explanatory variable in equation 3. Column (7) in Table 3 reports the result of
the estimation when the instrument used in the rst stage is the local housing supply elasticity
(i.e. Column (3) of Table 4). The coecient estimated from this IV regression is very close to
the one obtained from the OLS regression, equal to .065 and remains signicant at the 1% level.
10A potential issue with pooled regressions as the ones presented in Table 3 is that they might
conceal a fair amount of heterogeneity in the elasticity across time. The sensitivity of investment
may be dierent in a growing environment than in a recession for instance. We cannot report
yearly estimates, but we reproduce the estimation of equation 3 on two dierent sample periods:
before 1999 (Columns (1), (3) and (5) in Table 5) and after 2000 (Columns (2), (4) and (6) in
Table 5). The coecients before 1999 are only marginally higher than those after 2000. The
signicance of the coecient of interest does not seem to come from some particular years in
our sample.
3.3 Heterogeneous Responses: Ex Ante Credit Constraints
As pointed out in a dierent context by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), it is unclear a priori
that the sensitivity of investment to collateral value should be increasing with the extent of
credit constraints.14 This remains ultimately an empirical question which we answer using three
dierent ex ante measures of credit constraints based on: (1) dividend payments (2) rm size
and (3) credit rating. Those measures are dened in Section 2.1.2. We estimate equation 3
separately for \constrained" and \unconstrained" rms.
As reported on Table 6, there is a strong cross-sectional heterogeneity in the response of
investment to balance sheet shocks. The sensitivity of investment to collateral value is on average
twice as large in the group of \constrained" rms relative to the group of \unconstrained" rms.
For instance, the coecient  for rms in the 3 bottom deciles of the size distribution is .09
compared to .045 for the rms in the 3 top deciles. The dierence between these two coecients
is signicant at the 5% level for all three measures of credit constraints.
3.4 Collateral and Debt
In this Section, we try to explore the channel through which rms are able to convert capital
gains on real estate assets into further investment. In unreported regressions, we investigate
whether rms, when confronted with an increase in the value of their real estate assets, are
more likely to sell them and cash out the capital gains. We do not nd it to be the case. This
implies that outside nancing has to increase to explain the observed increase in investment.
Standard theories of investment with collateral constraints (as, e.g. in Hart and Moore (1994))
would predict that collateral value leads to more or larger issues of new debt, secured on the
appreciated value of land holdings.
Table 7 reports results of the eect of an increase in land value on debt issues, using COM-
PUSTAT data. To simplify interpretations and minimize endogeneity issues, we remove the
Cash and Market/Book controls from equation (3), and replace investment on the right hand
side with debt issues and debt repayments:
DebtIssues
s
it = i + 
s








14For instance, rms with strong agency problems may simply have a lower ability to convert collateral into
cash, because of these very agency issues.
11To obtain estimates comparable to investment results, our debt issues variables are normal-
ized by lagged tangible xed assets (PPE). Thus, the results obtained when estimating equation
4 should be compared with the coecient  derived in Column (2) of Table 3, i.e. .06.
The results are presented in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) look at the inows and outows
of debt. We nd that land holding rms make larger debt issuances and repayments when the
value of their real estate increases. A $1 increase in collateral value increases debt issues by
13 cents and debt repayments by 7 cents. The dierence, i.e. the net debt issues, corresponds
to an increase in the inows of debt of 4 cents, in a range similar to the observed increase in
investment. The fact that both repayment and issues increase when collateral value increase
suggests that rms take advantage of the appreciated value of their collateral to renegotiate
former debt contracts, reimbursing former loans and issuing new, cheaper ones. If this were the
case, the marginal interest rates of companies with increasing collateral value should decrease.
Unfortunately, COMPUSTAT only reports a noisy measure of average interest rates, preventing
us from testing this natural interpretation of the results. Doing so would require the use of an
alternative source of data. A potential worry with results in Column (1) to (3) is that ows data
(i.e. issuances and repayments) are of a lower quality than stock data (i.e. the level of long-term
debt). Column (4) conrms the robustness of these results by looking at yearly variations in
the stock of long-term debt. The reported coecient is similar to that in Column (3).
On the short-term liability side, lines of credits might be easier to obtain when secured on
valuable collateral (e.g. Su, 2009). However, we observe only a small, positive and slightly
signicant net increase in short term debts, with a coecient of .5 cents per dollar. Borrowers
are more likely to use longer-term liabilities to nance their additional investment.
3.5 Are Real Estate Purchasers dierent from Non-Purchasers?
The decision by rms to own real estate assets on their balance sheet is not random. This can
introduce a bias in the various regressions we have presented so far. For instance, if rms with
more cyclical strategies were to own their real estate properties { for a reason we do not model
here { the estimated  would be upward-biased.
In this section, we show that our results are robust to assuming a time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity across rms that would aect both the real estate ownership and the sensitivity
of investment to real estate prices. Our test consists in estimating the sensitivity of investment
to real estate prices for rms that purchase a property both before and after this acquisition.
We nd that, before the acquisition, future owners are statistically indistinguishable from rms
that never own real estate. Yet, these rms behave like other real-estate holding rms after they
acquire their properties.
To implement this idea we do not rely on the market value of the real estate assets, but only
on whether rms own real estate or not. This allows us to work with a larger sample, as we do
not require information on buildings depreciations.
We start with a sample of all COMPUSTAT rms that are not in the Finance, Insurance,
Real Estate, Construction or Mining Industries, that are not involved in major takeovers, and
that have at least three consecutive years of appearance in the data. The sample period is 1984
to 2007, 1984 being the year when information on real estate assets appears in COMPUSTAT.
We dene a rm as a purchaser if it has initially no positive real estate assets on its balance
12sheet and positive real estate assets after some date.15 We exclude from our sample rms that
move several time between 0 and positive real estate assets, i.e. multiple acquirers. We also
require that the rm has at least three years of available data before and after the purchase of
the real estate asset. We end up with a sample of 876 purchasers and 11,083 purchaser-year
observations, with purchasing date ranging from 1986 to 2005. The number of purchaser-year
observations before the purchase is 4,733. The group of non-purchaser is dened as those rms
that always report no real estate assets throughout their history in COMPUSTAT. This leaves
us with a sample of 2,742 rms and 15,842 rm year observations for non-purchaser.
We rst estimate equation (1) separately for non purchasers and for purchasers before the
purchase of land. The results are presented in Table 8, Column (1) and (2). If anything,
purchasers have, prior to acquiring real estate, a lower sensitivity of investment to real estate
prices than non-purchasers. More importantly, the dierence between the two is not statistically
dierent from 0. Future owners are statistically indistiguishable from non-owners before they
acquire land. The data rejects the existence of a time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that
would simultaneously aect real estate ownership and investment sensitivity to the local real
estate cycle. However, we emphasize again that this does not imply that the decision to own
land is exogenous: rms could decide to buy real estate anticipating that their investment
opportunities will be more correlated with the local real estate cycle, creating a bias in the
estimation.
The sample of purchasers also allows to conrm the nding in Section 3.2 by investigating
the within dimension of the data. In order to do so, we also estimate equation (1) for purchasers
after they acqure real estate assets. The results are presented in Column (3) of Table 8. The
sensitivity of investment to real estate prices is .47 for purchasers once they become land holders,
and it is signicant at the 1% level. Relative to Column (2), we see that purchasing real estate
is associated with a .54 increase in the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices. This
dierence is signicant at the 3% level. This dierence between owners and non owners is larger
but not statistically dierent from the comparable coecient in Column (4) of Table 3.16
Column (4), (5) and (6) of Table 8 run the same regressions as in Column (1), (2) and (3)
using variations in long-term debt as a dependent variable. The sensitivity of debt issues to
local real estate prices for land-holding rms is not signicantly dierent from that of future
owners before they purchase their real estate assets (Column (4) and (5)). Debt issues become
signicantly more sensitive to local real estate prices after rms acquire land (Column (6)).
Overall, the analysis in this section conrms that our main results on investment and debt
issuance do not seem to be caused by a time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that would
simultaneously aect real estate ownership and investment or debt sensitivity to the local real
estate.
15Before 1995, many rms have missing real estate data in COMPUSTAT. To maximize the number of pur-
chasers, we dene as a purchaser a rm that has initially missing real estate observations, then 0 real estate
assets and then positive real estate assets for the remaining years.
16As the estimation of equation 1 corresponds to a specication with a RE OWNER dummy variable, the
natural benchmark is that of Column (4) in Table 3
133.6 A Closer Look at the Real Estate Bubble
In this Section, we investigate the impact of the recent surge of real estate prices between 2002
and 2006 on corporate investment. This allows us to (1) further test the robustness of our
results (2) reduce the extent of measurement errors and (3) provide a simple illustration of the
methodology used in this paper. This Section follows closely the methodology outlined in Mian
and Su (2009) and is similar in spirit to that in Gan (2006).17
We divide the sample between MSAs with high and low local housing supply elasticity
(fourth vs. rst quartile), and between rms owning vs. renting real estate. In order to reduce
the extent of measurement errors (see Section 2.3), we hand collect information on headquarter
ownership for rms that report at least some ownership in COMPUSTAT in 2001.18 We thus take
seriously the claim made in Section 2.3 that headquarters represent a signicant fraction of the
non-specic real estate assets held by corporation and restrict the identication on headquarters
ownership. We then simply compare the evolution of investment of headquarters' owners vs.
renters in cities with high vs. low elasticities.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of oce prices from 2001 to 2006 depending on the MSA
local housing supply elasticity. It conrms that, while the bubble had a more dramatic impact
on residential prices, it did also aect commercial prices. Low elasticity MSAs experienced
a much larger increase in oce prices (30% increase in 2 years) than high elasticity MSAs.
Figure 2 implements our methodology looking at growth in assets. In low elasticity MSAs,
rms owning their headquarters experienced a 70% growth in assets (blue line, left panel), while
the aggregate assets of rms renting their headquarters saw only a 15% increase (red line, left
panel). By contrast, in high elasticities MSAs, there is no signicant dierence in the evolution
of assets of rms owning their headquarters (blue line, right panel) relative to rms renting
them (red line, right panel). It clearly shows a signicant net eect of local real estate prices
on corporate investment. Figure 3 leads to similar conclusions on long-term debt: rms owning
their headquarters in low elasticity MSAs took advantage of the real estate price bubble to
increase their stock of debt relative to rms in similar MSAs but renting headquarters and
relative to MSAs where the bubble did not have a large impact on oce prices.
Table 9 conrms these graphical evidence using rm-level regressions. We adopt a standard

























m is MSA m oce
price growth from 2001 to 2006 and Headquartersi is a dummy equal to 1 if rm i owns its
headquarters in 2001.
Column (5) in Table 9 directly estimates equation 5 while Column (1) uses variation in long-
term debt normalized by initial assets as a dependent variable. Column (2) and (6) augment the
17Again, it is worth emphasizing that Gan restricts her analysis to the time-series dimension, i.e. she does not
exploit the cross-sectional variations in real estate prices.
18Such data collection is possible for 2001 (and not in 1993) as 10K les for this year are available online
through the SEC website.
14previous regressions by controlling for initial rm size. This is natural as there is a fair amount
of heterogeneity between rms owning their headquarters and rms renting them. Column (3)
and (7) replace oce price growth by local housing supply elasticity: this corresponds to the
reduced form of an instrumental variable regression where growth in price from 2001 to 2006
is instrumented by local housing supply elasticity. Finally, column (4) and (8) use quartiles
of local housing supply elasticity instead of the elasticity itself. Overall, results in Table 9 are
coherent with Figures 2 and 3. Firms owning their headquarters experienced a signicantly
larger growth in assets and long-term debt relative to renters, especially so in MSAs where oce
prices increased a lot, i.e. in MSAs with lower housing supply elasticity. This eect is monotonic
in the local housing supply elasticity. It is also economically important: taking the estimate of
column (6), an increase in real estate prices of 25% (which corresponds to the dierence between
high and low elasticity MSAs, see gure 1) leads to an increase in rms' assets by 0.79x0.25=20%
over the 2001-2006 period.
4 Conclusion
When the value of a rm's real estate appreciates by $1, its investment increases by approxi-
mately 6 cents. This investment is nanced through additional debt issues. The impact of real
estate shocks on investment is stronger when estimated on a group of rms which are more
likely to be credit constrained. As we showed in this paper, real estate represents a signicant
fraction of the assets held on the balance sheet of corporations. As a consequence, one could
expect the impact of real estate shocks on aggregate investment to be non-trivial. However, this
is not necessarily the case in a world where responses to balance sheet shocks are heterogenous.
In particular, small rms respond more than large rms, which attenuates the agregate impact
of credit constraints. Understanding how one can go from the micro estimates we oer in this
paper to the macro impact of real estate shocks on investment, and therefore on GDP, remains
unclear. We hope to tackle this question in future research.
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17A Construction of Accounting Ratios
Aside from data on real estate, we calculate other accounting variables following the standards of the corporate
nance literature. We compute investment rate as the ratio of capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT item #128)
to past year's Property Plant & Equipment (item #8).19 We compute the Market-to-Book ratio as follows: we
take the total market value of equity as the number of common stocks (item #25) times end-of-year close price
of common shares (item #24). To this, we add the book value of debt and quasi equity, computed as book value
of assets (item #6) minus common equity (item #60) minus deferred taxes (item #74). We then normalize the
resulting rm's \market" value using book value of assets (item #6). We also use the ratio of cash ows (item
#18 plus item #14) to past year's PPE (item #8). Leverage is computed as the ratio of short-term and long
term liabilities (item #34+item #9) normalized by total assets (item #6).
We use COMPUSTAT to measure debt issuance. We measure long term debt issues as long term debt issuance
(item #111) normalized by lagged PPE (item #8). We also compute long term debt repayment (item #114)
divided by lagged PPE. Finally, only the net change in current debt (item #301) is available in COMPUSTAT,
and we also normalize it by lagged PPE. Net change in long term debt is dened as long term issuance minus
long term repayments normalized by PPE. Because data on issuances and repayments are sometimes missing,
we also compute net change in long term debt as the yearly dierence in long term debt normalized by lagged
PPE.
In most of the regression analysis, we use initial characteristics of rms to control for the potential hetero-
geneity among our 2,750 rms. These controls, measured in 1993, are based on Return on Assets (operating
income before depreciation (item #13) minus depreciation (item #14) divided by total assets (item #6)), Assets
(item #6), Age measured as number of years since IPO, Leverage, 2-digit SIC codes and state of location.
Finally, to ensure that our results are statistically robust, all variables dened as ratios are windsorized at
the 5th percentile.20 Table 1 provides summary statistics on most accounting variables used in the paper. We
simply remark that the debt-related variables (Debt Repayment, Debt Issues, Net Debt Issues and Changes in
Current Debt) have a high means (.75 for debt issues, for instance) but fairly low medians (e.g., .01 for debt
issues).
19This normalization by PPE is standard in the investment literature (see, e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
or Almeida et al. (2007)). It provides typically a median investment ratio of .21. An alternative specication is
to normalize all variables by lagged asset value (item #6), as in Rauh (2006) for instance, which deliver notably
lower ratios. Our results are robust to this alternative normalization choice.
20Windsorizing at the rst percentile or trimming the variables at the 5th/1st percentile does not qualitatively
change our results.
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21Table 2: Determinants of Real Estate Ownership
RE OWNER RE Value (State)
(1) (2)
2nd Quintile of Asset .16*** .071
(.021) (.066)
3rd Quintile of Asset .31*** .13**
(.022) (.069)
4th Quintile of Asset .48*** .27***
(.024) (.074)
5th Quintile of Asset .48*** .035
(.028) (.086)
2nd Quintile of Leverage .14*** .2***
(.02) (.062)
3rd Quintile of Leverage .18*** .19***
(.021) (.066)
4th Quintile of Leverage .17*** .17**
(.022) (.068)
5th Quintile of Leverage .23*** .28***
(.022) (.069)
2nd Quintile of ROA .099*** .33***
(.022) (.069)
3rd Quintile of ROA .12*** .25***
(.023) (.072)
4th Quintile of ROA .12*** .17**
(.023) (.071)
5th Quintile of ROA .13*** .23***
(.022) (.069)
2nd Quintile of Age .028 -.0091
(.021) (.066)
3rd Quintile of Age .094*** .11*
(.02) (.063)
4th Quintile of Age .21*** .47***
(.021) (.066)
5th Quintile of Age .23*** .89***
(.023) (.072)
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes
State Fixed Eect Yes Yes
Observations 2,738 2,738
Adj. R2 .58 .27
Notes: This table shows the determinant of Real Estate Ownership in 1993. The dependent variable
is RE OWNER (Column (1)), a dummy indicating whether the rm reports any real estate asset on
its balance sheet in 1993 and RE Value (Column (2)), the market value of real estate assets in 1993.
Control variables include 5 quintiles of Asset, Age, Leverage, ROA, as well as Industry and State Fixed




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 4: First-Stage Regression: the Impact of Local Housing Supply Elasticity on Housing
Prices
MSA Residential Prices MSA Oce Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local Housing Supply ElasticityMortgage Rate .028*** .036***
(.0044) (.0072)
First Quartile of ElasticityMortgage Rate -.064*** -.066***
(.0071) (.013)
Second Quartile of ElasticityMortgage Rate -.046*** -.033**
(.0077) (.016)
Third Quartile of ElasticityMortgage Rate -.014** -.0097
(.0067) (.023)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,358 1,358 804 804
Adj R2 .94 .94 .84 .84
Notes: This table investigates how local housing supply elasticity, as dened by Saez (2009), aects
real estate prices. The dependent variable is the real estate price index, dened at the MSA level {
Column (1) and (2) { and the MSA oce price index { Column (3) and (4). Column (1) and (3) use
directly the local housing supply elasticity, while Column (2) and (4) use quartiles of the elasticity. All
regressions control for year as well as MSA xed eects and cluster observations at the MSA level. ,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 8: Real Estate Prices and Investment: The Case of Purchasers
Capital Expenditure Changes in Long-Term Debt
Non Purchaser Purchaser Non Purchaser Purchaser
Purchaser Before the After the Purchaser Before the After the
Purchase Purchase Purchase Purchase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MSA Oce Prices .068 -.07 .47*** .07 -.27 .29*
(.067) (.18) (.15) (.053) (.19) (.15)
Cash .017*** .03*** .04*** -.006*** -.0071 .0059
(.0027) (.0082) (.01) (.0021) (.0064) (.01)
Market/Book .035*** .036*** .029*** -.0072*** -.0067 -.013
(.0036) (.0085) (.0094) (.0026) (.0067) (.0092)
Test\Purch.=Non Purch." .076 .14
Test \Purch. before=Purch. after" .03** .02**
Observations 17,480 2,289 2,611 17,648 2,307 2,616
Adj. R2 .35 .4 .39 .15 .18 .17
Notes: This table looks at the investment behavior of real estate purchasers compared to non-land holding Corporations. Capital
Expenditure, normalized by lagged PPE, is the dependent variable in Column (1) to (3); Changes in Long-Term Debt, normalized
by lagged PPE, is the dependent variable in Column (4) to (6). Column (1) and (3) looks at the sensitivity of investment and
debt issues to MSA Oce Prices for rms that never own real estate assets in our sample. Column (2) and (4) looks at the same
sensitivities for rms that will acquire real estate but before they acquire it. Column (3) and (6) estimates the same sensitivities
for real estate purchasers but after they have purchased their real estate assets. Test \Purch.=Non Purch." presents the p-value
from a t-test of equality of the MSA Oce Prices coecients between the non-purchasers and the purchasers before the purchase.
Test \Purch. before=Purch. after " presents the p-value from a t-test of equality of the MSA Oce Prices coecients between the
purchasers before and after the purchase. All specications control for Cash and previous year Market to Book, use year and rm
xed eect and cluster observations at the state-year level. , , and  means statistically dierent from zero at 10, 5 and 1%
level of signicance.
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